Internet protocols is fundamental to network function, yet this same flexibility permits the possibility of malicious use. In particular, malicious behavior can masquerade as benign traffic, thus evading systems designed to catch misuse of network resources. However, perfect imitation of benign traffic is difficult, meaning that small unintentional deviations from normal can occur. Identifying these deviations requires that the defenders know what features reveal malicious behavior. Herein, we present an application of compression-based analytics to network communication that can reduce the need for defenders to know a priori what features they need to examine. Motivating the approach is the idea that compression relies on the ability to discover and make use of predictable elements in information, thereby highlighting any deviations between expected and received content. We introduce a so-called "slice compression" score to identify malicious or anomalous communication in two ways. First, we apply normalized compression distances to classification problems and discuss methods for reducing the noise by excising application content (as opposed to protocol features) using slice compression. Second, we present a new technique for anomaly detection, referred to as slice compression for anomaly detection. A diverse collection of datasets are analyzed to illustrate the efficacy of the proposed approaches. While our focus is network communication, other types of data are also considered to illustrate the generality of the method.
I. INTRODUCTION
C OMMUNICATION systems utilize a well-defined yet flexible system of rules, referred to as communication protocols, that allows two or more entities in a network to transfer information; examples include DNS, TCP, and SSL. As a result, network communication is largely machine generated and highly structured; these regularities are fundamental to network function. However, the builtin flexibility of communication protocols also renders them vulnerable to a variety of abuses. For example, protocols can be manipulated to deny service [1] , [2] , and/or hide malicious information that can compromise network function and security. In addition, by sending unexpected or malformed messages that exploit bugs or inadequate defenses in protocol implementations, adversaries can crash or hijack victims [3] .
This same protocol flexibility has also enabled the development of complex network environments and applications, which makes it difficult for an adversary to perfectly imitate the behavior of benign network communication [4] . The traditional approach to the detection of protocol manipulation is to systematically look through protocol data for errors that reveal known types of abuses that have occurred in the past [5] . A limitation with this approach, of course, is that any new type of attack will likely be missed. In particular, given the continuously increasing skills of network attackers, it is necessary to find ways to automatically detect novel manipulations of network communication when the features and/or level of description of the manipulation is unknown to the defender. Moreover, the massive amounts of communication taking place in typical networks, combined with the fact that any intentional deviation of a communication protocol is likely to be a rare event, render the detection of communication protocol abuses quite challenging.
Herein, we seek to develop methods to detect abuses of communication protocols that do not require a priori knowledge of the features of the manipulation expected. In particular, we address the classification and detection of manipulations in network communication via compression algorithms. Compression analytics covers a broad set of algorithms where the ability to compress data items is used to infer information about their structure and similarity. A contribution of the current work to the field of compression analytics is a so-called "slice compression" (SC) score to characterize local (as opposed to global) behavior in communication protocols. We demonstrate and provide use cases for a local SC score that can 1) improve protocol classification by identifying and excising application content, and 2) identify unexpected or anomalous content in communication protocols using a novel threshold modeling technique.
A summary of some previous work in this area is provided in Section II. In Section III, we discuss the fundamentals of compression analytics and their use in classification and anomaly detection. In Section IV we introduce some example datasets, then apply our techniques to these data in Section V. Concluding remarks are provided in Section VI.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
Anomaly detection methods can be broadly classified into rule-based systems and statistical, data-driven approaches. Rule-based systems require domain expertise to look for known types of anomalies; data-driven approaches look for statistically rare patterns and can identify unknown types of anomalies [6] - [8] . Compression algorithms fall under this latter category.
Previous work in the area of compression-based anomaly detection of network traffic considered the entropy of feature distributions in network traffic, which inherently requires a definition of the feature space [9] - [13] . Gu et al. [9] develop a behavior-based anomaly detection scheme that compares the empirical distribution of network traffic against a baseline distribution, where baseline is determined using a maximum entropy approach. Wagner and Platter use compression algorithms to approximate the entropy in network traffic features [10] , where the authors focus on IP addresses and port numbers to detect the propagation of Internet worms. More recently, a maximum entropy discrimination method has been proposed that incorporates statistical anomalies with utility labels in order to detect high-utility anomalies [13] .
Although these previous works required a definition of the feature space, compression algorithms can also be applied in a featureless scheme, where, for example, sequences that do not compress well with respect to a trained model are identified as anomalous [14] , [15] . Our work falls into this latter class of compression algorithms, whereby we apply a compression algorithm to compute a slice compression (SC) score on a sequence. The novelty of our work lies in the SC score, which produces a signal that is then modeled as a random process in order to determine the threshold for local anomalies. The number of anomalies, rather than a compression score, is used to rank sequences as anomalous.
We note that although we are focused on the application of compression for detecting the manipulation of communication protocols, compression algorithms are general and data agnostic. Previous work in other fields include clustering of news stories [16] , newsgroups [17] , musical compositions [18] , tweets [19] , and genomics and phylogeny [20] . Recently, compression techniques have been utilized to help identify deception in written communications [21] .
III. METHODS
In this section we discuss how model-based compression algorithms can be applied in analytics for improved clustering and anomaly detection. We begin by introducing our slice compression (SC) score.
A. Model-Based Slice Compression (SC)
Let S = x 1 x 2 . . . x m be a sequence of tokens of length m < ∞, where x k ∈ A is a token from the alphabet A. In the normal use of compression analytics, the compression algorithm is applied to the entire sequence S at once, producing a global score in the form of the number of bits required for the compression. In contrast, the objective of the slice compression (SC) algorithm is to identify some type of local behavior in a sequence by considering the compression of subsequences of S instead of the compression of the entire sequence at once.
Thus we introduce a particular subsequence that we refer to as a slice of S as
where k and w are the starting index and width, respectively, of the slice. We consider the ratio of the number of bits required to compress each slice normalized by the width w of the slice. Then if C is a compression algorithm, the SC score at index k is defined by
where C(x) denotes the number of bits provided by C when applied to x. Each z(k; w) gives a measure of how well, on average, C is able to compress each token of a slice.
By following the evolution of the scores across the sequence, we can track the local behavior of the sequence up to the resolution of the slice width. Here, it is important to note that the standard compression algorithms are usually performed on individual sequences, which means that the underlying statistics and structure have to be derived not only from the sequence itself, but from the components of the sequence leading up to the current position that is being compressed. For analytics, we develop a modelbased approach, where each sequence, or in our case, slice, is compressed using the statistics of background data, which forms the model. Arithmetic coding (AC) with prediction by partial matching (PPM) is a compression technique well-suited for this application.
AC [22] is a method for converting an arbitrary sequence of tokens into a real valued number of arbitrary precision. At each stage of the algorithm, the range of possible values is subdivided in such a way that larger subranges correspond to larger probabilities for the next token. The larger probabilities, in turn, require fewer bits to encode, resulting in better compression. There are a variety of ways to compute the probabilities of some token occurring. Prediction by Partial Matching (PPM) [23] , [24] is a method for computing and storing the underlying probabilities in a way that takes into account the previous tokens, which is referred to as a context. Taking into account the context can result in more efficient compression.
Thus it is of interest to calculate Pr(x|c 1 c 2 · · · c n ), which denotes the probability that the next token in S will be x ∈ A, given a context c 1 c 2 · · · c n ⊆ S of length n ≤ m. We note that, in practice, this probability can be estimated as
where count(abc) is used to denote the number of times subsequence abc occurs in S.
To summarize, the model-based SC technique involves 1) building a PPM model on training data and 2) applying AC to compress new data, slice by slice, using the PPM model. In contrast to standard compression, it is important that the PPM model is fixed and does not update when analyzing new data. This ensures that the compression of any future unknown slice depends only on the statistics of the model. We note that in our use of SC, the PPM model is trained on a set of unlabeled data. This unsupervised approach resembles the realistic scenario in which classification or anomaly detection is being applied to unlabeled network traffic on the fly. If labeled data is readily available to train the PPM models, the results of SC can be improved. In what follows, we discuss two applications of SC for investigating the local behavior of sequences.
B. SC for Improved Clustering
A standard approach for classifying data, particularly when no labels exist, is to partition the items into clusters of similar items based on a set of relevant features. In cases where the relevant features are unknown, a distance metric, such as the normalized compression distance (NCD) [25] , may be used. NCD is a compression-based distance metric that approximates the shared information between two data items, and is defined by
where C denotes a compression algorithm, C(S i ) is the size of the compressed version of sequence S i , and S i S j denotes the concatenation of two sequences S i and S j . We utilize the Lempel-Ziv algorithm [26] for computing the NCD, but note that other standard compressors may also be used [25] , particularly for the sequence sizes considered in this study [27] , [28] . Due to imperfections in compression algorithms,
Hence, we use the average of N (S i , S j ) and N (S j , S i ) so that our score is symmetric, but note that the results are insensitive to whether we use The traditional use of NCD measures similarity across an entire sequence in a single score, without differentiating regions of the sequence that may be more relevant for a given application. To improve the NCD-based clustering approach in the network traffic space, we propose a pre-processing step that involves excising highly variable (data) portions of the sequence, while retaining structural (protocol) portions, based on the slice compression (SC) scores z(k; w). To do so, we need to identify a threshold z * on the SC scores, above which the corresponding tokens are considered application data and should be excised. Many options exist for defining z * ; we choose
where z min = min k z(k; w) and z max = max k z(k; w). By setting t = 0.525, our threshold is slightly above the midpoint between the minimum and maximum slice compression score for that sequence. We comment that our thresholding scheme is naïvely implemented. Better results may be obtained by allowing z * to vary based on the expected minimum occurrence of the different protocol regions. We note that this pre-processing step assumes a balanced dataset such that the protocol regions in each class are more common (compress better) than any variable application region that will be excised. If one class is particularly rare, than any occurrence of protocol regions unique to that class will also be considered rare (compress poorly), leading to false negatives.
C. SC for Anomaly Detection (SCADe)
Herein, we formulate a new method for anomaly detection based on the notion that, relative to a model, slice compression (SC) may reveal local, unexpected behavior of a sequence. We refer to our method as slice compression for anomaly detection (SCADe). SCADe requires a threshold for identifying anomalous data. Thus, we model the output from SC as a random process, calibrate the model to available SC score data, and define a threshold as the level at which the probability of exceeding the level is a known prescribed constant.
Recall from Section III-A that z(k; w) denotes the size of a compressed version of the data within slice S k of width w, normalized by its width. Hence, score z(k; w) takes values in {0, 
for k = 1, . . . , m − w + 1, where μ(k; w) and σ (k; w) ≥ 0 are deterministic functions that represent the mean and standard deviation of random process Z , respectively, and A w is a random variable with zero mean and unit variance. We use different symbols z and Z to distinguish between the actual score data and its corresponding model, respectively. Because A w is a random variable, Z (k; w) defined by Eq. (6) is a random process. Suppose we have a collection of N sequences to analyze. Estimates for the mean and standard deviation of the random process Z can be obtained from
and
where we have assumed each z i has length m − w + 1. This assumption is not required, but we use it to simplify the discussion. We interpret the shifted and scaled scores {(z i (k; w) − μ(k; w))/σ (k; w), i = 1, . . . , N} as samples of random variable A w , which we assume are independent and identically distributed (iid). Future work may investigate the possibility that A w also depends on k and is therefore a random process with a non-trivial dependence structure.
Given samples of A w , a suitable threshold for anomaly detection can be defined as the function t (k; w) that satisfies
where p ∈ (0, 1) is a specified probability, assumed to be known. Knowledge on the expected likelihood of encountering anomalous data can be used to specify the value for p. For example, if we expect roughly 1 out of every 1000 sequences to be anomalous, then an appropriate value for p is 0.999. Note that knowing which sequences are anomalous is not required, only roughly the proportion of the data that is expected to be anomalous. It remains to find a suitable distribution for random variable A w . In cases when there is limited training data and/or there is prior knowledge on the expected shape of the probability density function (pdf), we choose a parametric model for A w . Alternatively, when data is abundant we can apply a non-parametric model such as a kernel density estimator (KDE) [30] , to approximate the pdf of A w . The non-parametric approach is attractive since, unlike the parametric model, the functional form for the model does not need to be specified ahead of time. The definition and calibration of the KDE to available training data can be done automatically and can be quite accurate when data is readily available.
Having calibrated a model for A w , the threshold function in Eq. (9) is then given by
where F −1 is the inverse cumulative distribution function (cdf) of A w , defined by
and f is the pdf of A w . We note that, by construction, Z and t defined above both take values in [0, ∞), which is inconsistent with the fact that the SC scores satisfy z ∈ {0,
andt
as approximations for Z (k; w) and the corresponding threshold function, respectively, where round(x) denotes the nearest integer to x ∈ R. This simple mapping ensures thatZ andt only take values in {0, 
If sequence S i is anomalous, we expect the size of its associated exceedance set, denoted by |E i (w)|, to be considerably larger than the size of the other sets. This procedure is the basis Fig. 1 . Three graph structures with α nodes: a) star graph with α − 1 edge nodes connected to a central node, b) random graph with each node connected randomly to an existing node, and c) micro-protocol graph with α − 2 edge nodes connected to a central node and the last node connected randomly to an existing edge node.
for predicting an anomaly. In addition, once we have identified the anomalous sequences, the elements in the exceedance sets indicate positions k within each sequence where the anomalous behavior occurs.
We note two cases in which our approach does not apply. First, the more common an anomaly becomes, the less successful SCADe will be at detecting the anomaly; our method is unable to detect a malicious, but common, attack. This should not be viewed as a limitation of the SCADe method since it is reasonable to expect defenses against common attacks to be well established. Second, compression algorithms take advantage of the inherent compressibility of data. If the data is not compressible, as is the case with encrypted content, then this algorithm is not applicable.
IV. DATASETS
To illustrate the proposed compression-based methods for clustering and anomaly detection, we will consider three different datasets: (1) graph protocols; (2) email headers; and (3) computer network traffic.
A. Graph Protocols
We begin with a synthetic dataset that, while of limited practical use, provides a systematic way to explore the various properties of the proposed methods. Further, it demonstrates that the proposed approach is data agnostic, and extends to other protocols beyond network traffic. We consider three different types of graph structures, as illustrated by Fig. 1 . The normal graph structure corresponds to a star graph with α − 1 edge nodes connected to a central node, the random graph structure is generated by connecting each node randomly to an existing node, and the micro-protocol graph structure is the same as the star graph, but with the last edge node instead connected randomly to an existing edge node. For conciseness, in what follows we refer to the micro-protocol as a micro graph. The micro graphs represent anomalous behavior in normal graphs where one change to the star is made. This modification represents a local change in, for example, a protocol manipulation.
For the three graph types, each node in the graph is labeled according to the following scheme:
where field is a common label for all nodes, i is a unique node ID that is one of {1, . . . , α}, and x 1 x 2 . . . x β is a sequence of tokens chosen uniformly at random from an alphabet A. Thus, in addition to the graph structure, the relevant parameters are the number of nodes α, the length of the random sequence β, and the alphabet A.
For analysis, we convert each graph to a Gephi [31] text file based on a protocol that Gephi uses to ingest and analyze graphs. Thus we can simulate network traffic with protocol and application data regions. An example of a Gephi file is shown in Fig. 2 . This file contains several header sections that are consistent through all Gephi files, followed by content that depends on the graph structure and label. In particular, each node in the <nodes> section contains a field where the value corresponds to the node label and each source and target in the <edges> section depends on the connectivity, as defined by the graph structure. The particular example depicted in this figure corresponds to a star graph with parameters α = 10, β = 5, and alphabet A = {a,b,c,d,e}.
We generate two datasets of Gephi files for analysis in Section V. Both datasets contain 20 each of star, random, and micro graph structures with α = 10 nodes. One dataset, which we denote by G 5 , contains nodes that are labeled with β = 5 random tokens; the other dataset, which we denote by G 50 , contains nodes that are labeled with β = 50 random tokens. Both sets of tokens are chosen uniformly at random from A = {a,b,c,d,e}. Thus, the only difference between the two datasets is the length of the random sequence β, and hence the amount of the simulated application data region contained in the two datasets.
B. E-Mail Headers
We also applied our techniques to a collection of 513 internal email headers. We emphasize that the emails were not inspected for any distribution of attributes, instances, or classes, which demonstrates that compression analytics do not require any a priori knowledge of the data. We focus on the RECEIVED: field, which contains the sender address and IP; the server address, IP, and protocol; and the date/time information. From this dataset, 510 email headers were received from internal senders; 3 email headers were received from external senders using a different server and a different protocol. We refer to the external emails as "anomalous".
C. Computer Network Traffic
We consider the intrusion detection evaluation dataset ISCXIDS2012, a collection of network traces that includes full packet payloads in pcap format 1 . From this dataset, we pulled out 159,350 DNS requests and 137,479 DNS responses, which were further filtered down to those pcaps whose length exceeds 1500 bytes. Our analysis is performed on this subset of 44,471 DNS responses. Within this subset, we identified 308 "anomalous" responses containing a resource record signature (RRSIG). Although having an RRSIG is not an indication of malicious behavior, it is comparatively rare and an example of systematically manipulating network traffic to accomplish something beyond the basic function of the protocol. It is this kind of systematic manipulation of network traffic that we are trying to detect. Further information about the dataset is discussed in [32] and [33] .
V. EXPERIMENTS

A. Graph Clustering
In this section, we demonstrate that NCD combined with excising by SC can be used to cluster the three graph structures (see Section IV-A for a description of the dataset) without having to a priori specify what are the protocol features defining the graph structure.
We begin with the G 5 dataset, which contains the shorter application data regions. Figure 3a depicts the pairwise NCD scores between Gephi files for the three types of graph structures. The graphs are numbered so that IDs i = 1, . . . , 20 are type star, i = 21, . . . , 40 are micro, and i = 41, . . . , 60 are random graphs; to simplify the figure we have assumed that the NCD is symmetric, i.e. N (S i , S j ) ≈ N (S j , S i ). It can be seen that the three graph structures have distinguishable interand intra-NCDs. In particular, the scores for the intra-NCD amongst star graphs and amongst micro graphs are the lowest (dark blue); these two graph structures have the greatest self-similarity in structure. This is followed by the scores for the inter-NCD between star and micro graphs (light blue). In contrast, the random graphs have notably higher interand intra-NCDs than both the normal and micro graphs. This implies that, for this case, any pairing of a normal graph with a micro graph is more similar than a pairing of any two random graphs.
In Fig. 3b we also show results for the dataset with longer application data regions, G 50 . Here, the different types of graph structures no longer have distinguishable inter-and intra-NCDs. Furthermore, the range of NCDs is consistently higher for G 50 than for G 5 (note the scale on the z-axis). These results can be understood by noting that the longer sequences of random tokens in G 50 increase the NCD between all possible pairings of graphs. Furthermore, the contribution from the application data regions can no longer be ignored as background noise to the NCD.
In Fig. 4 , we present the results of clustering the star (s), micro (m), and random (r) graphs using the matrix of NCD scores N defined in Section III-B. In particular, we apply the k-means clustering algorithm with k = 3 and visualize the results using multidimensional scaling (MDS). MDS is a form of non-linear dimensionality reduction that aims to place each object in d-dimensional space such that the between-object distances are preserved as well as possible [34] . For dataset G 5 (Fig. 4a) , we can clearly identify three clusters for each of the three graph structures, whereas for G 50 (Fig. 4b) , there is a single undifferentiated cluster with the random (r) graphs on the periphery. Given knowledge of ground truth, we can quantify the performance of the clustering algorithm using various metrics based on true and predicted labels. Briefly, the adjusted rand index (r) and normalized mutual information (m) measure the similarity and agreement, respectively, for two clustering assignments [35] . The homogeneity (h) captures if clusters contain members from a single class and the completeness (c) captures if all members of a single class are assigned to the same cluster [36] . Table I shows that clustering the G 5 graphs using the NCD metric returns a perfect score for all the clustering performance metrics considered in this work; the same does not hold for the G 50 dataset.
To recover the ability to cluster graphs based on the NCD metric, and in particular to identify the structural protocol change between the star and micro graphs, we apply SC trained on the full set of N = 60 graphs and the threshold defined in Eq. 5 to identify and then remove the application data portions based on the assumption that these portions should exhibit lower compressibility than protocol portions. We note that the proposed excising method is generally robust to the slice width w, which must be large enough to contain a PPM context n that compresses the protocol data, but small enough so that the compression of the protocol data is not overwhelmed by the incompressibility of the application data. For our G 50 dataset we chose a slice width of w = 10; see Fig. 5 for an example. As a result of the excising, Fig. 4c , shows that k-means using NCD has recovered the ability to identify clusters of graphs based on similarities in protocols. This result is supported by Table I , where we see that we have recovered a perfect score for all performance metrics for the excised G 50 dataset.
A question arises as to how clustering using NCD as the distance metric performs relative to clustering using other distance metrics. For comparison, we utilize a distance metric based on an n-gram (i.e. a contiguous sequence of n tokens) model as follows. Given two sequences S i and S j , we compute the n-grams of each, form the corresponding frequency vectors v i and v j , then take the cosine distance between these two vectors, that is
This n-gram approach has been utilized for many applications; examples include genomics and text [37] , [38] . Metrics for clustering results using 1-grams and 10-grams are presented in Table I , together with the NCD results discussed previously. It can be seen that the n-gram approach performs worse than NCD for all graph datasets considered. Interestingly, the 1-gram and 10-gram representations of the data perform comparably for the G 5 and excised G 50 datasets, but the 1-gram performs significantly worse for the G 50 dataset (< 0.1 for all performance metrics). This is expected since the G 50 dataset is defined by β = 50 random tokens, causing the frequency of occurrence of the 1-grams from the application region of the graphs to dominate the distribution. In contrast, the probability of any 10-gram occurring is low so that the distribution of 10-grams is dominated by the 10-grams from the protocol regions. These results indicate that an information-based distance metric, as approximated by compression, captures similarity that a simple n-gram does not.
B. SC Applied to the Micro Graphs
In the previous section, we showed how SC could be applied to identify and excise highly variable application data regions prior to clustering the graph protocols. Here, we demonstrate how SC can also be used to detect an anomalous micro change in the graph protocol.
In Fig. 6 , we show results for SC trained on a set of 20 star (blue) and 1 micro (red) graphs, each with α = 10 nodes labeled with β = 50 random tokens drawn uniformly from A = {a,b,c,d,e}. This dataset is essentially a modified version of the G 50 dataset for anomaly detection of the micro change. The subfigures show the value of the SC scores z(k, w) as a function of the index k in the sequence. Each result is for context length n = 10, and each subfigure corresponds to a different slice width w. For w = 5 and w = 10, anomalous behavior is observed in the slice compression score at index k ≈ 2200. This anomaly represents the micro change of one of the target nodes in the Gephi file from the central node to an edge node. Because this pattern occurs rarely (in fact, only once) in training the PPM model, it requires significantly more bits to encode. Furthermore, because we only look at the compression slice-by-slice, the anomaly is not reduced by the β = 50 random tokens in the application data sections of the sequences.
Although SC is robust to the slice width, it is not entirely insensitive. For w = 2, the anomalous micro change goes undetected because the context of the PPM model (which is limited by the slice width) is too short to capture the fact that the unique ID of the target node was connected to an ID that did not correspond to the central node.
C. SCADe Applied to E-Mail Headers
Next, we apply SC to a more realistic dataset of email headers introduced in Section IV-B. As opposed to the previous section, in which the anomalous micro change was identified by visual inspection, here we also demonstrate how SCADe can be used to automatically identify the anomalous emails based on the number of exceedances of a threshold function, t(k; w) defined by Eq. (13) .
Let {z i (k; w), i = 1, . . . , N} be available SC data obtained from a dataset of N = 513 email headers; these scores are referred to as training data for SCADe and are illustrated in Fig. 7 . The SC scores were obtained by compressing each email header using a PPM model trained on the full set of N = 513 email headers with context n = 10 and window sizes w = 2, 5, and 10. We truncate each sequence z i (k; w) so that all have equal length m for fixed w. This simplification is not required, but adds clarity to the discussion.
All but three of the email headers are observed frequently during training and therefore compress well. However, even within these "normal" email headers, SC identifies regions (k ≈ 40 and k > 110) with poor compression across all samples of the data. These regions correspond to the IP address and date/time information, respectively, regions for which we expect high variability and low compressibility. In contrast, the three "anomalous" email headers are consistently less compressible for all k. Upon closer inspection, these three emails were received from an external sender using a different server and a different protocol. The SC score automatically identified these features, resulting in lower compression in the corresponding slices. These results are consistent for all slice widths w considered, indicating the generality of the method for this dataset. To apply SCADe, we model the SC output as a random process defined by Eq. (6) and define a threshold as the level at which the probability of exceeding the level is a known prescribed constant. This process requires determining a model for the probability distribution of random variable
We demonstrate the method using a nonparametric model. Normalized histograms of the samples of A w are illustrated in Fig. 8 , together with the kernel density estimates (red lines). From the cdf of the kernel density estimates of A w , we can obtain the thresholdt(k; w) according to Eq. (13) . The resulting threshold functions (pink) are plotted together with the available training data in Fig. 9 for the three window sizes. Parameter p = 0.995 defined by Eq. (9) was used for calculations. Note that one of the anomalous emails has been highlighted in red for the discussion below.
To quantify the anomalous behavior, Fig. 10 illustrates values for |E i (w)|, that is, the size of the exceedance sets defined by Eq. (14), for all N = 513 email headers. It is clear from the figure that, while there are a few sequences with one or two exceedances, sequences i = 467, 506, and 510 contain significantly more exceedances than the rest, and are therefore classified as anomalous. These three sequences are anomalous for all w considered in this study.
In addition to providing a ranking for labeling sequences as anomalous, SCADe also provides the locations of the anomalies within the sequence. For example, sequence number 467 with slice size w = 2 has an associated exceedance set with |E 467 (2)| = 48 elements, given by E 467 (2) = {5, . . . , 7, 9 Anomalous sequence 467 is identified in Fig. 9 by a red line; the green shaded regions illustrate exceedance sets E 467 (2), E 467 (5) , and E 467 (10) , that is, those regions within sequence 467 where anomalous behavior is observed.
D. SCADe Applied to DNS Network Traffic
As a final example, we consider the network traffic dataset introduced in Section IV-C. A strength of the compression algorithms is that they require significantly less data than other currently popular neural network-based approaches. Therefore, from our dataset of 44,164 DNS responses, we randomly select, without replacement, 5,000 sequences to apply SCADe to. Recall that in our train/test scheme for SCADe, we train a PPM model on all N = 5,000 sequences and subsequently test each sequence S i for i = 1, . . . , N by computing the SC scores z i (k; w) using the PPM model. In order to identify anomalies, we compute a thresholdt(k, w) to obtain the size of the exceedance sets defined by Eq. (14) .
The SC scores for the first 100 test samples are illustrated by Fig. 11 assuming a window size of w = 200, where we have used a context of n = 2 (top) and 3 (bottom) for the underlying PPM model used by SC. The threshold function, t(k; 200), is illustrated by the pink lines for three different values of parameter p defined by Eq. (9) . As the value for p is increased, meaning that the expected likelihood of an anomaly is decreasing, the threshold function increases. The SC score for sequence #25, indicated by the red line in the figure, is identified as anomalous for all values for p and n. Manual inspection of the corresponding sequence reveals #25 to be a rare (for this dataset) instance of RRSIG.
We find that the results are sensitive to the context of the PPM model used to compute the SC scores; if n is chosen too large, then the probability of any sequence of tokens of length n occurring is low, even for normal network traffic, that the anomalous sequences are less rare, relative to normal. Hence, in Fig. 11 , the SC score of the anomalous sequence (red) starts to fall within the variance of SC scores of the normal sequences (blue) as the context is increased from n = 2 to n = 3. This dependence on n has been observed previously [21] , where we obtained an optimal accuracy in identifying deception in written text using n = 2.
To quantify algorithm performance, we construct precision-recall (P-R) curves and compare to an n-gram approach. In particular, we compare the n-gram frequency vector for a sequence S i to the model M, where the model is comprised of the 5,000 sequences. We use the cosine distance defined by Eq. (15) with v j replaced by v M , which represents the frequency vector for model M. We also compare our method with an alternative compression-based anomaly detection method developed by Wang et al. [15] . Figure 12 shows an interpolated P-R graph [35] for SCADe applied to the DNS network traffic data; the left and right plots correspond to context lengths of n = 2 and n = 3, respectively. We utilize SCADe with the same values for parameter p defined by Eq. (9) that we used in Fig. 11 . In general, the performance of SCADe improves when the value for p is increased. Recall that the value for p should be selected to be consistent with the average number of anomalies we expect in the dataset. For this data, the actual number of anomalies is 42 out of 5000, meaning that 1 − 42/5000 ≈ 0.992 should be an optimal value for p. For p = 0.999, we find that the threshold is too high to identify all the anomalous sequences and hence we obtain only 0.8 and 0.6 recall for n = 2 and n = 3, respectively. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, SCADe is sensitive to n, where we achieve optimal precision-recall for n = 2.
By Fig. 12 it is clear that SCADe outperforms both the n-gram and Wang approaches, regardless of the value for p and n. Both alternatives produce a single score per sequence, whereas we develop our SC approach specifically to identify local behavior in a sequence, which produces a collection of scores for each sequence (see Fig. 11 ). When combined with the novel threshold modeling technique, SCADe successfully identifies anomalous responses in the DNS network traffic dataset based on the number of anomalies, i.e. the size of the exceedance set.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a collection of new models and algorithms that utilize compression techniques for the classification and detection of anomalies within communication protocols. The methods are general and do not require prior recognition or extraction of identifying features. A core idea of this work is to use a novel slice compression (SC) technique to automatically identify portions of the communication data as either protocol or application data. SC was successfully used as a pre-processing step to automatically remove most of the application data portions, thereby allowing normalized compression distance to classify network communication based on similarities of protocol features. Slice compression for anomaly detection (SCADe) also proved to be an excellent approach for identifying local manipulations of protocols, and was successfully applied to a variety of artificial and realistic datasets. SCADe requires a threshold function, which was developed based on a random process model for the sliced compression score. Future work in SCADe would involve removing identified anomalous examples from the training data and iteratively recalibrating the threshold function.
